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THE MARCOS HUMAN RIGHTS 
LITIGATION: CAN JUSTICE BE 
ACHIEVED IN U.S. COURTS FOR ABUSES 
THAT OCCURRED ABROAD? 
ELLEN L. LUTZ* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within a month of ex-Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos's 
arrival in the United States in February 1986, half a dozen civil lawsuits 
were filed against him in United States District Courts for human rights 
violations that occurred in the Philippines during his presidency. The 
lawsuits alleged that Marcos was personally responsible for summary 
executions; disappearances; torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment and punishment; and prolonged arbitrary detention in the 
Philippines between 1971 and 1986. Plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction for 
these suits under the Alien Tort Claims Act, which provides: "The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States."! Plaintiffs sought compensatory and puni-
tive damages from Marcos. 
Two types of lawsuits were filed: actions on behalf of approxi-
mately thirty named individuals, and a class action on behalf of all 
victims of torture, disappearance, and summary execution from Mar-
cos's declaration of martial law in September 1972 un til his departure 
from the Philippines-approximately ten thousand persons.2 Marcos 
* California Director, Human Rights Watch. BA., Temple University; J.D., University of 
California. 
128 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993). The handful of plaintiffs who had become naturalized United 
States citizens based jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993) (federal question jurisdiction) or 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 (1993) (diversity jurisdiction). 
2 See, e.g., Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986); Hilao v. Marcos, No. 
86-0390 (D. Haw. 1989). The author is counsel to plaintiffs in two individual actions, Sison v. 
Marcos, No. 86--0225 (S.D. Cal. filed June 30, 1986), and Piopongco v. Marcos. The suffering of 
the plaintiffs in these two cases is typical of that of all the plaintiffs. Jose Maria Sison, a leftist 
political leader and outspoken opponent of Marcos, was arrested in 1977. Immediately after his 
arrest, Marcos personally interrogated him. Sison was then subjected to water torture and other 
extreme physical abuse, including several days of beatings. This was followed by a seven-month 
period during which he was chained by one hand and one foot to a cot, denied the use of his 
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moved to dismiss the suits.3 In 1986, U.S. district court judges in Hawaii 
and California dismissed all the lawsuits on the ground that even if 
Marcos was responsible, the act of state doctrine barred U.S. courts 
from trying the cases.4 The dismissals were reversed by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which remanded the cases to the district 
courts to determine whether the lawsuits should be dismissed for any 
of the other grounds raised by the defendant.5 Plaintiffs' counsel then 
moved for pretrial consolidation of the lawsuits, which was granted. In 
January 1991-nearly five years after the lawsuits were filed-federal 
district court Judge Manuel Real, sitting in the district of Hawaii, 
denied Marcos's motion to dismiss on all grounds and ordered the 
parties to prepare for trial. 6 
The trial was bifurcated into liability and damages phases. The 
liability phases of all the cases were tried before a single six-member 
jury in September 1992. The jury found Marcos personally liable for 
most of the plaintiffs' torture, as well as for the loss resulting from the 
eyeglasses, and confined in a small, suffocatingly hot room with no natural light He spent the 
rest of his eight-and-a-half year detention in solitary or near-solitary confinement. 
Francisco Sison, Jose Maria Sison's brother, was a member of Marcos's economic staff. 
Because he was a civil servant, Marcos could not fire him when Jose Maria became a political 
liability. Francisco, who had been under surveillance, disappeared in 1971. According to the 
family, he left one morning for Malacanang (the presidential palace) in a chauffeur-driven car. 
Francisco, the driver, and the car were never seen again. Local and federal police did not 
investigate the disappearance. 
Jaime Piopongco was politically active in the Liberal Party and owned a radio station. 
Immediately after the declaration of martial law in September 1972, agents of Marcos searched 
his home and closed and destroyed his radio station. Piopongco hid until he was arrested in 
November. He was taken to Malacanang where he was held incommunicado, interrogated by 
high-ranking military officials, and subjected to mock executions. He was then transferred to 
Camp Crame where he was held until late December. He was released to house arrest and 
remained under armed surveillance in his own home until 1976, when he escaped and fled the 
country. 
3 Marcos argued that he was immune from jurisdiction because he was either the de jure or 
the former president of the Philippines; the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the alien tort claims; plaintiffs lacked standing; plaintiffs 
failed to demonstrate a private right of action under international law; the lawsuits raised 
nonjusticiable political questions; the alleged acts were acts of state; plaintiffs' cause of action was 
barred by the statute of limitations; plaintiffs failed to exhaust their domestic remedies; and on 
the basis of forum non conveniens. 
4 Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207 (D. 
Haw. Oct. 31, 1986). The act of state doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that enables U.S. 
courts to refrain from examining the legality of the official acts of a foreign state on their own 
territory when doing so "might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the 
conduct of our foreign relations." Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682,697 (1976). Accord International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
5 Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir 1989). 
6 Taking Tyrants to Court, AM. LAW., Oct. 1991, at 56. 
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disappearance or murder of loved ones.7 At the end of 1993, the 
damages phase of the lawsuits was still pending. 
Previous lawsuits against persons accused of torture, disappear-
ance, and summary execution in other countries have been brought 
in U.S. courts; in some cases, large default judgments have been won.s 
The Marcos litigation was the first lawsuit for human rights abuses in 
another country that was tried on its merits in a U.S. court.9 Despite 
Marcos's death in 1989, the lawsuits proceeded against his estate. 
The trial offered plaintiffs their only opportunity to establish Mar-
cos's accountability for human rights violations and to receive compen-
sation for their suffering. Neither criminal nor civil proceedings 
against Marcos were possible in the Philippines because Philippine law 
required that a defendant be physically within the jurisdiction of the 
court when served. lO Even though Marcos, when he was alive, asserted 
his willingness to return to the Philippines and defend himself there, 
President Corazon Aquino refused to allow his repatriation. ll Thus, 
although many of the plaintiffs reside in the Philippines and much of 
the evidence needed to prove his liability was there, U.S. courts were 
the only judicial fora with jurisdiction to hear human rights claims 
against Marcos. 
Using the Marcos case as an example, this Article addresses 
whether justice and reparation can be achieved in United States courts 
for human rights abuses that occurred abroad. The process of restor-
7 In one case, the jury also found Marcos liable for the prolonged arbitrary detention of one 
of the plain tiffs. 
8 Filartiga v. Peiia-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y 1984); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, 
No. 87-2057 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 1988); Rapaport v. Suarez-Mason, No. 87-2266 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
11,1989); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
9 A second contested case, Abebe:Jiri v. Negewo, No. 90-2010 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 1993), 
involving detention; torture; and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment in 
Ethiopia was tried in a two day trial in Atlanta in May 1993. The defendant was present and 
represented himself pro se. The three individual plaintiffs established that the defendant was 
responsible for their torture and mistreatment, and the court awarded them $1,500,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages. 
10 "Extraterritorial service of summons under § 17 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court (Philip-
pines) is not available in personal actions and would not satisty the constitutional requirement 
of due process under Philippine law." Declaration of Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr., appended to 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in (1) Response to Defendant's Reply Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities and (2) Response to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum, Sison v. 
Marcos, No. 86-0225 (S.D. Cal. filed June 30, 1986). When actions against nonresident defen-
dants do not affect the personal status of the plaintiff, Philippine courts have no power to enforce 
their processes beyond the territorial limits of the Philippines. MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS 
ON THE RULES OF COURT, VOL. 1, at 456-57 (1979). 
II Seth Mydans, Marros Indictment Will Aid Manila, Aquino Says, N.Y TIMES, Oct 23, 1988, 
§ 1, at 3. 
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ing justice to a society that has endured gross violations of human 
rights requires that the truth be revealed, that it be acknowledged 
publicly, that those who perpetrated the abuses be punished, and that 
the victims be rehabilitated and compensated.12 When a rights-abusing 
government is ousted, it is the responsibility of its successor to restore 
justice by investigating and establishing a record of all abuses, and to 
make that record known so that a factual basis exists both for trying 
those alleged to be responsible and for aiding those who have suf-
fered. 13 The government also has a duty to the victims to ensure that 
they have an effective remedy via competent national tribunals for acts 
violating fundamental rights.14 
II. REVEALING AND ACKNOWLEDGING THE TRUTH 
From the start, the Marcos human rights litigation was handi-
capped because the Philippine government had never undertaken an 
investigation of the human rights abuses that occurred during the 
Marcos era. ls Nor did the Philippine government facilitate the investi-
12 See generally, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON (1989). 
13 See, e.g., Velasquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C, no. 4) at 1 174 (1988), 
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 291 (1989). "The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
human rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation 
of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identilY those responsible, to impose the 
appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation." Id. 
14Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), 
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 298 (Burns H. Weston 
et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS]. With respect to at least the most egregious 
violations of internationally recognized human rights-including torture, disappearance, and 
summary execution-an international consensus has emerged that the nation responsible must 
provide victims with reparations. See generally, Theo van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to 
Restitution, Cumpensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities, 45th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1993); Nigel S. Rodley, The International 
Legal Consequences of Torture, Extra-Legal Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989). The Republic of the Philippines did not 
ratilY the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra, 
at 376, until October 3, 1986--after Marcos's departure. The duty to provide an enforceable 
remedy under the provisions of that treaty are therefore not applicable. MULTILATERAL TREATIES 
DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARy-GENERAL at 123, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/ll (1993). 
15 Shortly after assuming office in early 1986, President Corazon Aquino appointed a Presi-
dential Committee on Human Rights (PCHR) to investigate past and present abuses, and named 
highly respected former Senator Jose Diokno as its chair. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, IMPUNITY: PROSECUTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES 19-20 
(1991). Out of concern that early prosecutions might detract from other objectives of the human 
rights community and destabilize the new government before it had time to consolidate power, 
Diokno devised a strategy of preparing a handful of airtight "test cases" for prosecution. Id. at 
20. Unfortunately, Diokno became terminally ill shortly after his appointment. Mter his death, 
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gation efforts of nongovernmental actors. Although Mrs. Marcos's 
shoes were placed on official display, government records and the 
personal knowledge of government officials that could expose the 
massive human rights abuses of the Marcos regime remain shrouded. 16 
The lack of governmental will to expose and acknowledge the truth 
impeded efforts to punish those responsible or provide an effective 
remedy to the victims. The passage of time dampened Philippine 
public enthusiasm for investing financial, political, and emotional capi-
tal to uncover and redress abuses of the Marcos era. Furthermore, 
redressing and preventing serious human rights abuses committed by 
the post-Marcos government seemed of greater urgencyP Because the 
Philippine government acted neither quickly nor diligently to establish 
the truth, Marcos-era victims had no governmentally established fac-
tual foundation on which meaningful redress for their suffering could 
be based. 
Victims needed to find a venue outside the political and cultural 
environment in which the abuses had occurred. The lawsuit was 
brought in a foreign forum where foreign substantive, procedural, and 
evidentiary rules applied. Even most of the actors in the trial were 
foreign-American lawyers argued the cases of Filipino human rights 
victims to an American judge and jury, before an American audience. IS 
Much of the plaintiffs' evidence consisted of the testimony of experts 
from American human rights organizations and the U.S. government. 
In addition, because of cultural and linguistic barriers, difficulties 
obtaining visas, and the expense of bringing Filipino witnesses to 
Hawaii, many Filipino victims testified via video deposition instead of 
the PCHR failed to implement even Diokno's conservative strategy. Id. To date, only a handful 
of Marcos-era human rights abuses have resulted in convictions. No high level official in the 
Marcos administration has faced criminal charges, and the Philippine government has taken no 
steps to assess Marcos's liability for human rights abuses committed during his years in office. Id. 
at 57-58; Diane Orentlicher, Discussion Paper: The Philippine Experience, Presentation at the Aspen 
Institute for Humanistic Studies Conference on "State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon" (Nov. 4-6, 
1988). 
160ne popular explanation for the Aquino government's failure to aggressively investigate 
and prosecute Marcos-era human rights abuses was that doing so might lead to a coup by 
increasingly restive military officers. That several key members of Aquino's administration would 
have been inculpated by any serious human rights investigation also undoubtedly influenced her 
decision. Human rights investigations also were a casualty of the Aquino government's higher 
priorities, including weathering a series of coup attempts, waging war against the New People's 
Army, and proving that Marcos committed wholesale theft against the national treasury. 
17 For examples of post-Marcos human rights abuse in the Philippines, see AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL, PHILIPPINES: THE KILLING GOES ON (1992); AsIA WATCH, PHILIPPINES: VIOLATIONS 
OF THE LAws OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES (1990). 
181n Sison v. Marcos, No. 86--0225 (S.D. Cal. filed June 30,1986), plaintiffs' counsel included 
one Filipino lawyer. 
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appearing in the courtroom. Consequently, only a handful of the more 
than ten thousand Marcos-era victims had their cases presented.19 
While the task of revealing the truth was accomplished in the 
United States, there was no acknowledgement of the truth by the 
Philippine authorities. Nonetheless, many victims and their supporters 
present at the trial felt satisfaction that the truth at least had been 
acknowledged by a court. To some extent, other victims in the Philip-
pines shared this sentiment once the press publicized the jury's finding 
of Marcos's liability. 
III. PROSECUTING AND PUNISHING THE PERPETRATORS 
The lawsuits brought against Marcos in the United States were 
civil, not criminal. 20 Even though the courts found Marcos civilly liable 
for human rights abuses, no criminal responsibility was attached to that 
finding. While his death made this issue moot, it was very much alive 
in the early years of these proceedings when many of the plaintiffs 
longed to see Marcos found guilty and punished for his crimes. Plain-
tiffs had hoped that in a civil trial before an impartial judge and jury, 
Marcos's accountability for the abuses they suffered would be estab-
lished. Few believed, however, that even a large damages award would 
effectively punish Marcos. They cynically assumed that such a damages 
award would constitute only a small part of Marcos's hidden wealth, 
and that payment would cause him little hardship. They also worried-
and continue to worry-that Marcos (or his estate) would find a way 
19 See Sison v. Marcos, No. 86-0225 (S.D. Cal. filed June 30, 1986); Trajano v. Marcos, No. 
86-0207 (D. Haw. July 18,1986); Hilao v. Marcos, No. 86-0390 (D. Haw. 1989). 
20 When the Marcos litigation was filed, there was no universal jurisdiction to prosecute 
torturers. Since that time, however, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Convention Against Tor-
ture] entered into force. G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26,1987), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984). 
The Convention Against Torture requires that states make torture a punishable offense when it 
is committed within their territory, by their nationals, or against their nationals. Id. In addition, 
in the absence of such a link, states must exercise universal jurisdiction over any torturers found 
within their jurisdiction and either try them or extradite them to a country that will. Id. In 1990, 
the United States Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Convention Against 
Torture. S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), in 136 CONGo REc. D1436, 
D1442. Mter the U.S. Congress passes the implementing legislation (currently contained within 
the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act, H.R. 3355, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993», the 
United States will deposit its articles of ratification to the treaty with the United Nations Secre-
tariat. Thereafter, foreign public officials who directly inflict, instigate, consent to, or acquiesce 
to torture would be subject to criminal prosecution or extradition if they came to the United 
States. Id. 
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to place his assets beyond the reach of the U.S. court so that little or 
no money could be collected. 
Because U.S. foreign sovereign immunity law barred the plaintiffs 
from naming the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant,21 plaintiffs 
had sued Marcos only in his individual capacity.22 The fact remains that 
the Republic of the Philippines should bear some responsibility for the 
gross violations of human rights suffered by its people. Furthermore, 
many individuals besides Marcos share responsibility for the atrocities 
committed during his regime. In filing their lawsuits, however, plain-
tiffs restricted their claims to those individuals over whom a U.S. court 
could obtain jurisdiction. Thus, even though Marcos was found liable, 
the Philippine government and most of the other individuals who 
share responsibility for the atrocities avoided liability altogether. 
IV. PROVIDING REPARATION FOR THE VICTIMS 
Even though plaintiffs prevailed in establishing Marcos's liability, 
major hurdles still lie ahead in establishing the amount of damages. 
Moreover, money is the only form of reparation plaintiffs can seek. 
Many of the remedies the Philippine government could have offered 
lie outside a U.S. court's authority to order.23 
21 28 u.s.c. § 1605 (1993). 
22 Many of the original complaints also named General Fabien Ver, who was Marcos's chief 
of staff and who traveled to the United States with the Marcos family. Ver fled the United States 
before process could be served and his whereabouts are still unknown. 
One of the lawsuits, Trajano v. Marcos, named Imee Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos's daughter, 
as an additional defendant, and the court obtained personal jurisdiction over her. Ms. Marcos 
failed to answer the complaint and the court entered a default judgment of $4,161,000 against 
her. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the default judgment. Trajano v. Marcos, 978 
F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2960 (1993). 
23 These remedies include restoration of confiscated property; restoration of lost jobs; medi-
cal, psychological, or other counseling services; special education or job training benefits for 
victims and their children; and commemorative symbols or events. 
At the forty-fifth session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Pro-
tection of Minorities, Special Rapporteur Theo van Boven submitted his final report in a study 
concerning the right to restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation for victims of gross viola-
tions of human rights and fundamental freedoms. See Boven, supra note 14. That report con-
tained proposed basic principles and guidelines concerning reparation that included the follow-
ing forms of reparations: 
8. Restitution shall be provided to re-establish, to the extent possible, the situation 
that existed for the victim prior to the violations of human rights. Restitution 
requires, inter alia, restoration of liberty, citizenship or residence, employment or 
property. 
9. Compensation shall be provided for any economically assessable damage result-
ing from human rights violations, such as: 
(a) Physical or mental harm; 
(b) Pain, suffering and emotional distress; 
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The Philippine government did express its support for the human 
rights litigation against Marcos in the United States.24 One could con-
strue this support as a step by the government towards fulfilling its 
international human rights obligations. Nevertheless, by not providing 
a reparations mechanism of its own, the government denied Filipino 
victims any guarantee that their claims would be satisfied. Moreover, 
the Philippine government has made its own claims on the assets 
controlled by Marcos's estate.25 Consequently, victims of human rights 
abuses fear that their reparation claims will be trumped by those of a 
government, which is not only responsible for their suffering, but 
which has provided no means of redress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The result achieved in the Marcos litigation falls short of the 
model of justice that has evolved under international law. The Philip-
(c) Lost opportunities. including education; 
(d) Loss of earnings and earning capacity; 
(e) Reasonable medical and other expenses of rehabilitation; 
(f) Harm to property or business, including lost profits; 
(g) Harm to reputation or dignity; 
(h) Reasonable costs and fees of legal or expert assistance to obtain a remedy. 
10. Rehabilitation shall be provided, to include legal, medical, psychological and 
other care and services, as well as measures to restore the dignity and reputation 
of the victims. 
11. Satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition shall be provided, including: 
(a) Cessation of continuing violations; 
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth; 
(c) A declaratory judgement in favour of the victim; 
(d) Apology, including public acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of 
responsibility; 
(e) Bringing to justice the persons responsible for the violations; 
(f) Commemorations and paying tribute to the victims; 
(g) Inclusion of an accurate record of human rights violations in educational 
curricula and materials; 
(h) Preventing the recurrence of violations by such means as: 
(i) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces; 
(ii) Restricting the jurisdiction of military tribunals; 
(iii) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary; 
(iv) Protecting the legal profession and human rights workers; 
(v) Providing human rights training to all sectors of society, in particular to 
military and security forces and to law enforcement officials. 
Id. at 57-58. 
24 For example, the Republic of the Philippines filed an amicus curiae brief in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in February 1987, urging that the Court allow the human rights cases 
against Marcos to proceed on the merits. 
25 See, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989). 
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pine government has sidelined itself from the process, and legal and 
procedural barriers hindered efforts to prosecute Marcos or seek the 
most appropriate forms of reparation. On the other hand, the Marcos 
litigation achieved a greater sense of justice than has ever been possible 
before. Although the result was a compromise, it was a welcome one. 
This was especially true for the individual plaintiffs who told their 
stories in a court of law. The normal aftereffects of traumatic human 
rights abuse-such as mistrust, shame, and the desire to bury the 
past-had prevented many of them from sharing their experience with 
others, or even facing their pasts themselves.26 Testifying required not 
only revealing their past, but stating it publicly in a formal and foreign 
environment. Therefore, there was a sense of relief as well as a sense 
of justice when the court announced its verdict. 
The liability judgement against Marcos was heralded in the Phil-
ippines as a major advancement in revealing the existence of human 
rights abuses during the Marcos era. The verdict prompted Philippine 
human rights groups, which formerly had played only a supporting 
role in the litigation, to become more actively involved. The efforts of 
these groups became essential in the process of identifying class mem-
bers and encouraging them to submit damages claims. 
For many of the victims, however, more than twenty years have 
passed since their torture or mistreatment. They are getting older and 
would like to see justice and reparations in their lifetimes. Although 
Marcos's liability was established in 1992, more than a year after the 
conclusion of the trial the damages phase has yet to be completed. 
Even when this phase is concluded, it is likely to be followed by years 
of appeals before plaintiffs can try to enforce their judgment. The 
Marcos family has demonstrated its ability to conceal assets, and the 
Philippine government has made clear its intent to recover for itself 
whatever assets can be found. Thus, the plaintiffs may be unable to 
collect any damages award that the court eventually declares. 
Despite these obstacles, the lawsuit was the only avenue available 
for the plaintiffs to seek justice. Their need for justice outweighed the 
procedural and legal hindrances they faced. Although they may not be 
financially compensated for the abuses they suffered, they have won at 
least some of the justice that they sought. 
26 For additional information on the long-term aftereffects of torture and other traumatic 
human rights abuses, see GLENN R. RANDALL & ELLEN L. LUTZ, SERVING SURVIVORS OF TORTURE 
(1991). 

